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An Analysis of the Secondary Market for
Live Music and Complementary Goods

Trevor Wangsness
ABSTRACT. Ticket scalpers exist because ticket prices in the primary market are often
set below the market equilibrium price. The question is why are prices consistently set
too low? One theory says that the desire to sell complementary goods such as concert
memorabilia explains why ticket price are set below equilibrium. Technological
improvements, however, have rendered that theory obsolete. Economic theory still does
not explain why ticket prices are frequently set too low. Perhaps the reason is simply that
artists do not want to gouge their fans.

I. Introduction
What causes the secondary market for live entertainment? Previous
researchers have come to the consensus that the ticket prices are
generally set below equilibrium, causing excess demand. However, there
is no clear answer as to why ticket prices are set below equilibrium. This
is especially puzzling because streaming platforms have made concert
revenue the most important source of income for musicians. While some
claim that the desire to sell complementary goods drives down the price,
changes in how complementary goods are sold in the last two decades
have made that claim irrelevant.

II. Background
There are five distinguishing characteristics in the market for
entertainment. First, concerts typically have relatively high fixed costs
and low marginal costs. Second, the quality of the experience is only
known after the event, even if there is an expectation beforehand. Third,
the value of the purchased ticket falls to zero after the event. Fourth, seats
will vary in quality. Finally, artists sell complementary goods such as tshirts and records (Connolly and Krueger 2005, 10).
Concert ticket sales begin in the primary market. The performer,
promoter, and venue agree on a revenue sharing policy, as well as ticket
prices and sale dates. Tickets are sold to consumers through different
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modes: the box office, ticketing agencies, and online. A ticketing agency
comes to an agreement with the promoter to buy and resell tickets. In the
past, even with a processing fee, ticketing agencies sold a larger quantity
of tickets due to convenience, (Courty 2003, 87-89).
Ticket prices are typically chosen at the revenue-maximizing level,
coinciding with the amount and quality of each seat. Prices of
complementary goods are also set at the revenue-maximizing level.
Sellers generally set ticket prices lower than equilibrium. One
explanation is that maximizing attendance will also maximize sales of
complementary items (Connolly and Kruger 2005, 5-10).
In the market for entertainment, each performance is a unique
product, meaning that consumers prefer specific events. This
differentiability gives sellers monopoly power. Economic theory
suggests that price would be set such that there is no excess demand
(Halberg 2010, 175).
In economic theory, the market would clear in the primary market.
Sellers, however, set tickets prices below equilibrium for a variety of
reasons: the desire to sell complementary goods, creating a consistent
fan base through easily accessible shows, and selling out events more
easily. The low price creates excess demand. The number of seats
available in a given venue is lower than the number of consumers willing
to pay for the event. Since the quantity demanded exceeds the quantity
supplied, a queue is created. For example, a consumer may need to wait
in line to purchase a ticket when it goes on sale before it sells out
(Halberg 2010, 174-176).
The queue introduces an extra cost into the purchase of a ticket,
which is time. The real cost of the ticket becomes the price plus the time
set aside to acquire the ticket. But in today’s world, this idea may no
longer be true. A large majority of tickets are purchased online. Instead
of waiting in line, consumers simply purchase the tickets from their
phones. The time cost may be minimal due to technology, but online
queues still exist, leaving excess demand. Consumers may prefer paying
extra to avoid the wait (Halberg 2010, 175-176).
This creates the secondary market, commonly known as ticket
scalping. Scalping is a service to consumers to obtain tickets that are no
longer available in the primary market. Prices in the secondary market
are set to eliminate the excess demand (Halberg 2010, 176). There are
two kinds of scalpers in the secondary market. Some consumers initially
buy a ticket with the intention of actually attending the event, and later
decide not to. However, most make the initial purchase with the intention
of selling the ticket for profit.
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Before the days of the smartphone, there were official businesses
known as ticket brokers who resold tickets. These firms hired people to
wait in line for tickets in order to flip them. Most of these brokers were
in competitive markets in metropolitan areas. They would advertise their
services on websites and in phone directories. Most held a large number
of tickets with a variety of seat qualities for popular events. Brokers
would also be able to charge different prices for tickets of the same
quality, which does not occur in the primary market. A standard broker
is not connected to the primary market in any way. Since these scalpers
typically have a poor public image, promoters usually limit the quantity
of tickets sold to them, and support legislation either limiting or banning
resale above the primary market value. Promoters have also used
different methods to avoid resale, such as wristbands and nontransferability restrictions on tickets (Halberg 2010, 176-178).
In certain scenarios, ticket scalping can be beneficial. The entrance
of the secondary market can eliminate the excess demand created by the
primary market. If the secondary market sellers overestimate the demand
for an event, they may be forced to sell for less than the primary market
price. There is also a slim chance for ticket trades. However, similar to
any bartering system, the trouble lies in finding two consumers who have
mutually desired tickets to trade. CashOrTrade is a ticket trading website
that allows consumers to buy, sell, and trade tickets at face value. For the
scalper, facilitating the resale of tickets in the secondary market allows
them to capture a fraction of the surplus created. Finally, through the
advancement of technology, the resale of tickets has become convenient
and safe (Halberg 2010, 176-178).
While ticket scalping can provide beneficial outcomes, there are
negatives. In the eyes of the consumer, scalpers set prices ridiculously
high. Halberg suggests diehard fans of a certain artist may be cut out of
the market if they are unable to obtain tickets in the primary market and
cannot afford them through resale. Basic economic theory, however, tells
us those who value the event more will purchase the tickets. Since the
public dislikes ticket scalpers, politicians typically favor legislation
against the secondary market. If legislation is put in place and is actually
enforced (most anti-scalping measures are difficult to enforce due to
online sale), the market will not clear. Also, since some ticket scalpers
operate “underground”, meaning they do not report resale profit as
income, there is an unknown quantity of tax revenue lost (Halberg 2010,
178-179).
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III. Marburger’s Theory
Marburger (1997) provides a theoretical framework to determine why
tickets are priced below equilibrium in the primary market. In the model,
the quantity of tickets demanded depends on three things: price,
performance quality, and characteristics of the local market.
Complementary goods, such as merchandise, are available only to
consumers who attend the event. Therefore, the demand for
complements is included in the pricing decision. Marburger claims that
the quantity demanded for complements is a function of three things: the
price of the complements, the price of the ticket, and performance quality
(Marburger 1997, 376).
Marburger creates a profit function and maximizes it. Including
complementary goods means the pricing decision is akin to that of a
multi-product firm (the concert and the complements). Since the concert
is a performance good and the firm is a monopolist (according to theory),
prices will be set so the marginal revenue from sales of admission tickets
and complementary goods equals the marginal cost of admission tickets
and complementary goods. The profit maximizing price falls into the
inelastic portion of the demand curve. Marburger claims that since
complementary goods are only available to those who attend the concert,
lower ticket prices lead to increased potential for sales of complementary
goods. He also experiments by factoring the price of complements into
the demand for tickets. This provides the same result: ticket prices fall
into the inelastic section of demand. His analysis shows that due to the
presence of complementary goods at these events, the price of tickets is
lower than equilibrium, and the secondary market is created. (Marburger
1997, 376-377)
Since 1997, however, technology has changed how people buy the
complementary goods. Today artists make complementary goods
available for purchase online. Thus, the demand for merchandise does
not rely on the price of the ticket or the quality of the performance.
Marburger claims the existence of the secondary market is due to
complementary goods. However, the secondary market still exists today,
even with complementary goods available to all. In this case, his theory
no longer makes sense.
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IV. Analysis
Marburger’s analysis is recreated without ticket prices and performance
quality in the equation for complementary good demand. The quantity
demanded for tickets remains:
Q = Q(P, q, m)
(1)
Where P is the price of the ticket, q is the performance quality, and m is
the characteristics of the local market. An updated equation for the
quantity demanded for complementary goods is:
S = S(R)
(2)
Where R is the price of the complementary goods.
These two equations yield total revenue, total cost, and profit:
TR = (P) *Q + (R) *S
(3)
TC = hQ + rS + FQ + FS + w(q)q
(4)
π = TR-TC = (P-h)*Q - FQ + (R-r)*S - FS - w(q)q
(5)
Where h is the cost per seat, r is the cost per complementary good sold,
and FQ and FS are the fixed costs (e.g. wages) with respect to seats and
complementary goods, respectively. W(q)q is the term describing the
cost of the performing artist. Wages paid to artists are dependent on the
quality of the performances they provide (Marburger 1997, 376-378).
While Marburger takes the first order condition of the profit function
in terms of P, R, and q, the point of interest here is P:
πl (P): [(P-h)*Qp+Q]
(6)
Where Qp is the partial derivative of Q with respect to P. This equation
diverges from Marburger’s analysis. Since the demand for
complementary goods no longer relies on the price of the ticket, there is
no concession term in equation (6). Coincidentally, this matches
Marburger’s equation (6), in which he excludes the term for concessions.
Marburger then manipulates the equation, factoring out Q and
rearranging terms, which shows:
Q(P/Q*Qp+1) = hQp
(7)
Which can also be written as:
Q(𝜀p+1) = hQp
(8)
Where 𝜀p is the price elasticity of demand. As Marburger
acknowledges, equation (8) shows a potential monopolist pricing
decision. Since the capacity of a venue for a single event cannot
change, variable costs and marginal costs are minimal. Allowing h to
approach zero gives:
Q(𝜀+1) = 0
(9)
Equation (9) shows that without the term for concessions, profits
will be maximized when the price is set at the unit elastic portion of the
demand curve. Here Marburger adds in the concession term, and ends
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with a conclusion showing that profit maximization occurs in the
inelastic section of the demand curve. In other words, prices would be
set below equilibrium, thus leading to the excess demand, eventually
leading to the secondary market for tickets. However, since the updated
function for complementary goods does not include the price of the
ticket, the additional analysis does not occur.

V. Discussion/Limitations
The results of our analysis are simultaneously clear cut and ambiguous.
The updated theoretical analysis shows that complementary goods are
not the driving factor behind lower-than-equilibrium prices in the
primary market. Marburger’s theory is incorrect. However, the analysis
does not provide an answer. The economic theory provided does not
match reality. The simplest solution suggests bands and promoters are
not attempting to maximize profit. While it goes against economic
theory, artists may just want to provide entertainment at a reasonable
rate. When asked if overpaying for concert tickets was a bad idea,
country performer Tyler Childers said this:
Yes, it is bad. Let them keep their bot bought tickets…we
will play to an empty room, and some poor bastard will
be stuck with 150 tickets to a Tyler Childers show he had
no intention of going to anyways. They only do it
because they know you will buy it. Tell you what, give
ME $50 and I’ll give you a backstage pass, I’ll let you
drink our beer, eat our hummus, give you a naked picture
of Bea Arthur, and a shirt.
While using humor, Tyler Childers declares what seems so be the
sentiment for many artists. Profits are not the only motivation for
performers. They are also concerned about “fairness” and maintaining
a loyal fan base. (Tyler Childers, Twitter post, March 13th, 2018 [3:09
P.M.], accessed April 29th, 2020.)
Due to time and resource constraints, this analysis is unfortunately
less significant than it could be. An empirical analysis would be a strong
addition to the theoretical analysis. An extension would include an
empirical model, as well as a more expansive theoretical analysis in a
more general form. An optimization problem including all actors in the
market would be potentially beneficial. An ideal analysis would include
the profit maximizing levels for artists as well as promoters and venues.
Only one piece of a very large puzzle was analyzed.
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VI. Conclusion
Advancements in online consumerism have eliminated complementary
goods as a factor in the ticket pricing decision. While tickets are still
underpriced in the market, this analysis shows that it may not be due to
complementary goods. The attraction of easily selling out or creating a
more consistent fan base may be more applicable. These factors may
create the surplus demand, leading to the creation of the secondary
market. As the theoretical analysis shows, profits are maximized when
prices are set at the unit elastic portion of demand, leaving no excess
demand. Simply put, artists do not conform to the “rationality” of
economic theory.
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